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disclaimer applies. Abstract: This paper highlights the idea of combining CGE modeling with a micro-
household model (micro-simulation) to generate a convergent solution, thus providing 
the basis to perform counterfactual analysis of trade and fiscal policies, and their 
impact on poverty. In recent years, a number of papers have presented different 
approaches using CGE models to analyze poverty. Among them, the standard CGE 
models, which generates changes in the income of representative households in 
order to allow poverty analysis, albeit with no intra-group changes in the distribution; 
CGE models with high levels of household disaggregation (3200) and the micro-
simulation approach to modeling (with no feedback effect to the CGE model). In this 
paper, we provide an alternative to these methods that allows a richer micro-
household modeling than the first two approaches, while keeping the properties of 
standard CGE (feedback effect of household behavior) which is usually simplified in 
micro-simulation context. We also introduce segmented labor markets, with waiting 
unemployment, inspired by Magnac (1991), which provides a basic for important 
changes in household income (i.e. when a worker leaves unemployment or becomes 
unemployed). Global and decomposable poverty analysis and income distribution 
indicators are computed at base year and after a 50% reduction in trade. 
 
Keywords: Computable General Equilibrium Models, Estimation, Personal Income 
and Wealth Distribution, Measurement and Analysis of Poverty 
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Introduction 
 
In recent years, we have witnessed a flourishing literature around the nexus of macro-
modeling and poverty analysis. The recent impetus to this literature has been tied to 
the PRSP process that implicitly requires policy makers to present a framework for 
linkages between macroeconomic reforms and poverty. There seems to be a relatively 
wide consensus around key criteria to consider in this type of analysis. They are: the 
importance of prices and factor remuneration, the macroeconomic 
balances/coherence, and integrating household behaviours in terms of expenditure and 
labour market. In this context, we can see that the main challenge is to reconcile the 
microeconomic behaviours and the macroeconomic aggregates. The two fields that 
deal with these issues, and allow for linkages, are CGE modeling and consumers 
microeconomics (consumption and labour market). The recent methodological 
developments in the area have drawn upon both fields with different ways to apply 
them.  
 
CGE and income distribution has a relatively long history. The first attempts using 
them in this context, brings us back to the pioneering work by Dervis, de Melo and 
Robinson (1982), and Gunning (1983). These papers were followed by a second 
important wave in the early 90’s with the OECD sponsored papers such as Thorbecke 
(1991), Bourguignon et al. (1991), de Janvry et al. (1991) et Morrisson (1991)
2. The 
last impetus to this literature came near the end of the 90’s with contribution by 
Decaluwé et al. (1999a) Decaluwé et al. (1999b), Cogneau and Robilliard (2000), 
Agenor et al. (2001), Cockburn (2001), Bourguignon, Robilliard and Robinson (2002) 
and Boccanfuso et al. (2003) among others.  Each of these authors adapted standard 
CGE modeling in order to allow for income distribution or poverty analysis. We will 
classify the work in three main categories. The first one would be the CGE model 
with representative agents, which perform poverty analysis with variation of the 
average income of the representative household, (CGE-RH) or simply income 
distribution by comparing RH variation of income between groups. The second is the 
                                                 
2 In this literature we do not make reference to authors who exclusively looked at income distribution 
between groups of representative households. We refer to authors that attempted to look at the poverty 
indices or income distribution beyond the inter group comparison of RH.    4
integrated multi-households CGE analysis (CGE-IMH)
3; and finally, the sequential 
micro-simulation approach, which uses a CGE model to generate prices that links into 
a micro-econometric household micro-simulation model (CGE-SMS).  
 
The CGE–RH approach is the traditional method, and has been widely used in the 
literature at least for income distribution issues. In this approach, poverty analysis is 
performed by using the variation of income of the RH generated by the CGE model 
(output of CGE model) with household survey data to perform ex ante poverty 
comparison. Dervis et al (1982) have applied this approach, as well as de Janvry et al. 
(1991), Chia et al. (1994), Decaluwé et al. (1999a), Colatei and Round (2001) and 
Agenor et al (2001). The main drawback to this approach is that it either supposes 
there is no intra-group income distribution change, or that this intra-group distribution 
change is linked to a theoretical statistical relationship between average (µ) and 
variance (σ
2) of the distribution of the lognormal distribution. There is no economic 
behaviour behind this change in intra-group distribution. We can easily see that the 
average behaviour of a specific group is biased towards the richest in the group. As 
they are the ones endowed with most of the factors, their behaviour will be dominant 
in the group
4. The main advantage of this approach is that it is easier to use then other 
approaches, as it does not require specific modeling effort outside what is done in 
standard CGE modeling exercise. The modeller can simply use a standard CGE model 
and apply the outputs to perform poverty analysis.  
 
The second approach, is what we refer to as the CGE-IMH modeling. This approach 
consists of multiplying the number of representative households compared to the 
                                                 
3 Some make reference to this approach as the micro-simulation CGE approach, but we prefer to 
distinguish it since micro-simulation has been widely used in a different context and could lead to 
confusion. Micro-econometric household modeling used for policy simulations such as what is 
proposed in Mitton, Sutherland and Weeks (2000) is a good illustration of this approach as well as 
Bourguignon, F., F. Ferreira, and N. Lustig (1998), Bourguignon Fournier and Gurgand (2001) and 
Atalas and Bourguignon (2002). The main criterion for differentiating between the approaches is that 
the approach relays mainly on a micro-econometric household model. One of the approaches discussed 
later will describe the efforts made to combine this approach with macro modeling.  
4 Standard CGE modeling uses household groupings that will take into account the total income and 
expenditure of each group and the behavioural most parameters are calibrated from observed base year 
data. These parameters will in great part reflect the aggregate behaviour and not necessarily the average 
behaviour (This could easily be done but it is generally not done in this fashion). Moreover, when 
doing poverty analysis we are most interested by behaviour around the poverty line, nothing really 
demonstrates that the average of aggregated behaviour will be a representative of the households 
around the poverty line.    5
CGE-RH approach. With major gains in computing efficiency over the last few years, 
larger models become easier to solve. It is therefore quite simple to add as many 
households in the CGE model as what is found in income and expenditure household 
surveys. Decaluwé and al. (1999b) were the first to explore this approach; in which 
they used fictitious data. Cockburn (2001) on Nepal, Cororaton (2003) for the 
Philippines and Boccanfuso et al. (2003) in Senegal applied this approach to real 
country data. The main advantages of this approach, compared to the previous 
approach, are that they allow for intra-group income distributional changes as well as 
leaving the modeller free from pre-selecting household grouping or aggregation. The 
last issue on household aggregation has raised a lot of controversy, as, many have 
been using income deciles to group the households and other socio, demographic, or 
geographic criteria
5. This approach avoids this constraint as the modeller can perform 
any decomposition of poverty and income distribution analysis since all, or a large 
sample, of the household survey is directly used in the model. The main disadvantages 
of this approach are the limits it imposes in terms of microeconomic household 
behaviours. As a matter of fact, the size of the model can quickly become a constraint, 
and data reconciliation can be relatively difficult. On the first point, CGE modeling 
imposes that behavioural function respects certain conditions on behavioural 
functions. For example, modeling that introduces switching regimes are not easily 
modeled with standard CGE modeling software as the equation system of the model 
cannot change as the iteration process moves along.  Micro-econometric modeling 
provides much more flexibility in terms of the modeling structure used. It is easy to 
see that an increase of one production branch in a CGE-IMH approach using 5000 
households will increase the number of model equations by over 5000. If non-linear 
equations are used in such a model, the resolution difficulties are amplified. For the 
last constraint, the data reconciliation process will lead to changes in structure of 
either the income or expenditure of the household behaviour. This comes from the 
fact that both accounts need to be balanced out, as well as levelled to the national 
                                                 
5 For more discussion on this debate, see Decaluwé, Patry, Savard and Thorbecke (1999a), views have 
been exchanged between De Maio, Stewart and van der Hoeven (1999) who have strongly criticized 
the work done by Sahn et al. (1996) who replied in Sahn et al. (1999). The approach proposed below 
and in the multi-household approach eliminates this debate altogether.   6
accounts’ data found in the Social Accounting Matrix (SAM)
6. You will often find 
some under or over reporting for items in the Household survey.  
 
The third approach draws on micro-simulation literature, first developed by Orcutt et 
al. (1961). According to Bonnet and Mahieu (2000), micro-simulation is required to 
analyse income distribution (dispersion) opposed CGE since RH is a good indicator of 
changes in averages, but not in dispersion, while mostly using micro-econometrics 
modeling of household behaviours and using price vector generated by a CGE model 
or even exogenous price vector changes. An illustration of this approach can be seen 
in Bourguignon, Robilliard and Robinson (2002). The main advantage of this 
approach is that it provides richness in household behaviour, while remaining 
extremely flexible in terms of specific behaviours that can be modeled. The main 
drawbacks to the approach are the coherence between the macro and micro models, 
which is not always guaranteed, and the fact that the feedback effects of household 
behaviours are not taken into account in the CGE or macro model. In fact, it is 
possible to take into account part of the feedback effects as the modeller can compute 
aggregate elasticities from the household module to incorporate into the aggregate 
CGE behaviours, but complete feedback and coherence is not explicitly imposed. We 
will refer to this approach as the CGE-MS 
 
In this paper, we experiment with another method that attempts to use the advantages 
of the last two approaches discussed earlier.  We propose to examine coherence 
between the household model and the CGE model, introducing a bi-directional link 
and, therefore, obtaining a converging solution between the two models. The 
approach has three main advantages over the CGE-IMH approach. First, there is no 
obligation of scaling the household data to national accounts, and no need to balance 
income and expenditure. Consequently, it allows the modeller to use the exact income 
and expenditure structure found in the household income and expenditure surveys. 
The second advantage is that there is not limit to the level of disaggregation in terms 
of production sectors and number of households to be included in the model. This is 
likely to be a temporary constraint since computing power increases rapidly for the 
                                                 
6 Scaling data presents problems that have been partly resolved by approaches such as RAS methods or 
the entropy method proposed by Robilliard and Robinson (1999) but these methods will still introduce 
some level changes in the structure to balance out accounts.   7
CGE-IMH approach, but it is presently a real constraint
7. Finally, and most 
importantly, the degree of freedom in choices of functional forms used to reflect 
micro-economic household behaviour is much higher in this approach.  
 
Let us detail what we mean with this argument. In a CGE, there are some behavioural 
functional forms that do work since they do not respect inherent constraints to CGE 
models, such as regime switching behaviours. A regime-switching behaviour implies 
that a variable can have specific characteristics in presence of a certain conditions and 
another set of characteristics in presences of another set of condition. A good example 
of this is waiting unemployment, where a worker chose to work in a sector if his 
reservation wage is below the effective wage, and chooses to be unemployed, if it is 
higher then the prevailing wage rate. Modeling such behaviour involves setting 
conditions on equation resolution, and this is not possible to apply in most software’s 
with pre-programmed algorithm as the set of equations of the model need to be fixed. 
If one is interested by macro-economic results of such a model, this would not pose a 
problem as one aggregates the income obtained by households into one aggregate 
household. But if one wishes to attribute exactly who receives, informal sector wages, 
formal sector wages, and unemployment benefits (or no income), a regime switching 
mechanism is not possible with standard software such as GAMS. To resolve such a 
model, an alternative algorithm needs to be used and this is what we will attempt to do 
in the rest of the paper. 
   
The basic idea of the approach is to use the CGE model to generate a price vector 
(including wage rates) and a household micro-simulation (HHMS) model, to calculate 
the household behaviours (consumption and labour supply). These vectors are then 
fed into the CGE model in which they are now exogenous variables and the iteration 
process continues until the results, between two iteration processes for all variables, 
are equal to zero. In this context it is important to have the two models and data base 
                                                 
7This constraint is not independent of functional forms used in the model. Using Cobb-Douglas 
functional forms for consumption and production will allow the modeller to use a larger number of 
households in the IMH approach (Cororaton 2003 has used 24797 households with C-D functional 
forms). But the introduction of non-linear functional form will quickly pose numerical resolution 
problems. Some experiments done in Boccanfuso et al. (2003) have currently revealed difficulty in 
resolving a CGE model of 3272 household and 15 sectors with functional forms having a fair amount 
of non-linearity with the GAMS software. Choosing more linear functional forms and slightly reducing 
the number of production sectors (10 branches) have shown to facilitate resolution of the model.    8
as coherent as possible. In cases where a specific micro behaviour cannot be introduce 
directly in the model, a functional form that mimic the aggregate behaviour can be 
used for first approximation to accelerate the convergence. An example of this, with a 
labour supply function, will be shown in section dealing with the HHMS model. It is 
important to note that nothing guarantees a converging solution to be found; therefore 









C : Household consumption 
P : Price vector (goods and factors) 
Y : Household income 
X : Other endogenous variables 
LS : Labour supply 
γ :  Parameters of the model 
Z : Exogenous variables of the model 
ϕ : Marginal propensity to save 
 
 
                                                 
8 In parallel experiments on this line of work, we have found situations where the convergence was 
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The Aggregation Question 
 
This is a very important question that could have been addressed earlier, but, given its 
significance, we preferred to set this discussion in a separate section. The aggregation 
issue is at the centre of this debate since it is what allows us to go from the micro-
behaviours to the macro-model, and vice versa. The modeller launching into such an 
exercise should always reflect on what the final contribution of including a large 
number of households in the modeling exercise should be. Why not then simply use 
the CGE model into a HH model as was done by Sadoulet et al. (1992), or, then again, 
solely apply the approach proposed by Bourguignon, Robilliard and Robinson (2002). 
The answer to this question is linked to the aggregation question and its coherence. If 
the behaviour of RH in the CGE-RH model is a perfect aggregate of the behaviour in 
the HH model, there is no value added to linking the two models as the feedback 
effects of the household behaviour will be fully taken into account in the CGE model 
and the results of the HH model will provide all information necessary to do poverty, 
welfare and income distribution analysis.  
 
To address this issue, we need to look at both components of household behaviour in 
CGE modeling, namely the income and the expenditure behaviours. For the income 
side, in CGE modeling we generally have fixed factor endowments paid at their 
respective prices, fixed transfers from other agents of the model and dividends 
proportional to the total dividend payments. In the traditional CGE models, this 
approach to income modeling perfectly aggregates. We can look at the two important 
elements separately to show why it perfectly aggregates. First we have the capital or 
labour income that is represented by  r kdhh  and we can see that: 




h kdh KDH r kdh r KDH      where . 
KDH is the aggregate household capital endowment, kdh is the specific household 
endowment and r is the rental rate of capital. The same applies for most of the 
elements of the household income, as they are generally modelled the same way. One 
element, that is computed differently, is the dividend (Div). In the models, it is 
assumed that there is an amount of total dividends, which is distributed proportionally   10
between the households, which are endowed with shares of firms. Therefore, we have 
the following: 
1     where . = = ∑
h
h h h tdv TDIV tdv Div  
where tdv is calibrated at base year by isolating from the dividend equation. Given 
these relations we see that  TDIV Div
h















Consequently, on the income side we have perfect aggregation. This illustration is 
valid for most typical CGE modeling exercise. However, as we will see in more detail 
below, when we relax the assumption of fixed labour supply, the perfect aggregation 
on the income side will not necessarily hold. Our model of the labour market allows 
for workers to move from one labour market to the other, and, in and out of 
unemployment. This creates a constraint to aggregation as individual workers need to 
be taken into account and, as a result, we don’t have the conditions for perfect 
aggregation.  
 
On the expenditure side, the situation is somewhat different. For the expenditure 
function we can draw from Deaton and Muelbaeur (1980) to show that we get perfect 
aggregation if we can write the demand equation such that  ) , ( p x g q i i =  for one 
i g and for all i were i=1…n goods consumed. Moreover,  ) , ( p x gi , must be coherent 
with the utility function. This shows that, if we transfer income from the richest 
household to the poorest, it will have no impact on the total expenditure. In other 
words, this come to having all the same Engel curves, and these must be parallel for 
each household. The C-D utility function generates a demand system that respects the 
above conditions and aggregate perfectly. The other commonly used demand system 
is the Linear Expenditure System (LES)  which do not perfectly aggregate when 
calibrated such as proposed by Dervis et al. (1982). Selecting identical γ  and β  
parameter will not allow the modeller to balance out the household budget constraint. 
As for other elements of the household expenditure, we are faced with a situation 
                                                 
9 If the tdvh are calibrated such that 1 = ∑
h
h tdv .   11
where perfect aggregation is not necessarily achieved. Three specific elements are 
generally concerned; income tax, savings and transfers. In each of these three cases, 
we have the same type of relation that makes perfect aggregation unlikely occurrence: 
 















∂ ∑∑       
 
where  Ithh is the income tax paid by household h,  tyh is the income tax rate for 
household h and Yhh is the total income of household h; Tith is the aggregate income 
tax paid by all households, Ty the aggregate income tax rate, and Tyhh the aggregate 
household income. There is nothing but luck that will lead the modeller to obtain this 
condition. We have the same type of relations with the savings and transfers, as these 
rates are calculated on the specific household savings and transfers at the base year, 
and these are unlikely to sum to the aggregate calculated rate. We can see that, 
whenever a rate (income tax and savings) is calculated on the specific household 
income versus a share that calculated on the aggregate income  (see the dividend 
case), it is unlikely to respect perfect aggregation conditions. These three elements 
contribute to the fact that the aggregate household of the CGE model does not provide 
the identical feedback effect that would be obtained with disaggregated household 
feedback effects. The relative importance of these elements in the total expenditure of 
household will determine the degree of differentiation between the micro results and 
the macro results.  
 
It should be noted that the LES demand system aggregates perfectly when the γ (non-
discretionary consumption) and the β (budget share of discretionary expenditure) are 




















β γ  
where  ci is the consumption of good i,  γi the non-discretionary expenditure, βi 
marginal share of expenditure of good i, Ydh disposable income and Pi price of good 
i.   12
However, as we mentioned in previously this is not an option in the CGE context. 
Therefore we adopt the calibration method proposed by Dervis et al (1982). This 
consists of selecting income elasticities and Frisch parameters outside the model and 
calibrating the γi and βi parameter that will be household specific and will balance out 
its respective budget constraint
10.  
 
The Top-Down/Bottom-Up (TD-BU) CGE-Household Micro-Simulation Model 
 
In the paper, we combine the use of two types of models. The first one is relatively 
similar to the standard CGE model, such as presented in chapter 9 of Decaluwé et al 
(2001). The household micro-simulation model introduces the consumption behaviour 
through a linear expenditure system (LES), the equation that determines the income of 
the household, and finally, features of the labour market such as endogenous labour 
supply based on a theoretical labour market model that will be presented in the 
following section. We proceed to present the two sub-components of the CGE-TD-
BU approach. 
 
The Household Micro-Simulation model (HHMSl). 
 
As was stated previously, the household micro-simulation model comprises of a 
representation of the income structure and expenditure behaviour of the household. 
The household consumption is modeled by an LES demand system. We use the 
calibration method proposed by Dervis et al. (1982), but with all households having 
the same income elasticity of each good, and the Frisch parameter
11.  As for the 
                                                 
10 The following relation i i i ε ω β = between the marginal budget shares, ωi the average budget shares 
















 where γi is the non discretionary income and φ  the Fricsh parameter which is 








11We could have chosen to use differentiated Frisch parameters according to the income level of 
households, but it would only have increased the degree of heterogeneity in the household model. In 
this version of the paper we indirectly drew the LES parameters from Pollak and Wales (1969), given 
the fact that the aggregation level in our model does not correspond to the classification of this study. 
Agricultural goods all have the same parameters.   13
savings rate, it is calibrated as a fixed share of the household disposable income
12, and 
income tax rates are calibrated from the total income of the households. The savings 
and tax rates are household specific. These hypotheses are very important, as we saw 
in the previous section, since they contribute move away of perfect aggregation when 
going from the household level to the CGE model (with representative agent). These 
standard hypotheses will make a significant contribution to the differential results that 
we obtain from the two models in the first iteration of the policy simulations. All 
transfers received and given are exogenous.  
 
On the income side, we consider the capital endowment as being fixed to the level 
observed in the Family Income and Expenditure Survey (FIES-1997). In the 
household survey, we have information on the head of household sector of activity, 
and the amount of non-wage income. This allows for a mapping of the sector of origin 
for each household capital income. From the FIES, we classified the workers into 
qualified, unqualified work and unemployed, according to the category of work 
specified in the survey
13.  
 
In terms of labour market behaviour, we assumed that the labour market is segmented 
as was first proposed by Roy (1951), and further developed by Magnac (1991). As in 
Magnac, we introduce a formal labour market that is rationed with queued 
unemployment and an informal labour market, with waiting unemployment based on 
reservation wages of workers and unemployed. The approach is similar to what 
Cogneau (2001) did in his CGE-MS model. The type of modeling allows us to have 
two segmented labour markets, and two types of unemployment (rationed and 
waiting) with movement in and out of both labour markets and unemployment. We 
adopt the non-competitive version of the models proposed by Magnac (1991). The 
segmentation is obtained with a fixed wage and a cost of entry into the formal sector, 
which discourages the workers, with potential wages below adjusted with the cost of 
entry, to participate in the labour market segment to supply their labour on the market. 
                                                 
12 In fact it is the disposable income minus the non-discretionary income, which is used to calibrate the 
savings  ∑ − − =
j
j j P Ty Yh Yddh γ where Yh is the household income, Ty the income tax and last 
expression is the non-discretionary income. 
13 The information on the type of work performed by the head of household is very precise where 200 
types of work categories are found. Given the rich set of information, it is relatively easy to classify the 
workers as qualified or unqualified work.   14
In the formal sector, we make a relatively strong assumption that firms have perfect 
information and they will hire out the most qualified workers (workers with the 
highest potential wage). When they choose workers to layoff, they will layoff the least 
qualified workers. From the workers side, they will offer their labour on the formal  
market if their reservation wage minus the cost of entry is higher then the prevailing 
wage on the labour market.  
 
As for the informal sector the wage it is flexible and will adjust according to the 
prevailing supply and demand of labour. The reservation wage level of each worker 
determines their choice to supply their labour on this market and we aggregate the 
individual choices to determine the aggregate labour supply in the HHMS model. A 
worker will decide to offer is labour if his reservation wage is below the prevailing 
informal sector wage. The product of a set of observable and non-observable 















j* as the potential wage of worker i in sector j,  π is the price of the 
qualification in sector j and τi
j is the level of qualification attained by worker i, and Hi, 
his level of human capital and ui
j the non observable individual fixed effect. The non-
observed reservation wage is determined by the following equation: 
()
0 0 0 ln i i i i u Z H w + = γ  
where Zi are household characteristics. As we mentioned earlier there is a cost of 




i i i e Z H c + = γ ln  
 We can synthesize the model we described above with the following structure: 
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where w
1 is the formal sector wage, w
2 the informal sector wage, 
0
i w the reservation  
wage and c the cost of entry in the formal sector. This model is estimated with a 
Heckman two steps method: the Probit in the first stage, followed by OLS 
estimation
14. Results from this estimation are provided in the annexe 3 and they are 
used to classify workers, first, according to the above labour supply model, and 
second, with the potential wage for the selection process in the formal sector market.  
 
At base year, we will observe formal sector workers, informal sector workers as well 
as unemployed. It is important to build the queues around the frontiers of w
1 and w
2 as 
changes in real wages generated by the CGE model can be positive or negative. This 
will allow to capture marginal changes in both directions for both wages (or labour 
market). 
 
The queue of workers for the formal sector are taken from the workers supplying their 
work on that sector (according to the model described above) and from this group we 
rank the workers according to their potential wages wi
1*, and construct a queue from 
the observed workers and unemployed. Above, we will find the formal sector workers 
with the lowest potential wages, and bellow the border, the informal sector workers 
and unemployed with the highest potential wage. From this, when the real wage 
decreases, firms will hire out the most qualified workers just bellow the border first, 
and then, go down the queue; if the real wage increases, they will layoff the least 
qualified formal sector workers just above the border.  
 
It is important to add that we can make external shocks on the nominal wage
15 for 
policy simulation purpose. Therefore, we needed to add a condition that, for a worker 
to offer his labour on the formal market, the new formal wage must be above his 
                                                 
14 The method used for estimation differs from Magnac (1991) and Cogneau (2001) as they supposed 
dependence of choice for qualified and unqualified sector as we supposed independence of choices. 
Matlab was used for the estimation of the model and a random sample of 13000 potential workers was 
taken from the total sample of 39520. Using the whole sample posed computational problems. For 
more information on this labour modeling approach, see from Magnac (1991) and Cogneau (2001).   
15 In the discussion on labour supply we talk about the nominal wage, where in fact we should be 
talking about the real wage, which is the decision parameter for the worker. However, in our modeling 
exercise, the price index is fixed and therefore the important element is the nominal wage. This is not 
the case for the producer as the real wage he faces takes into account his sector specific market price 
and not the general price index.    16
reservation wage. The two conditions of the above model for the worker must, 
therefore, be satisfied for him to be included in the queue.  
 
On the informal sector, we classify the informal sector workers with the highest 
reservation wages and place them just above the border (wage). They will be the first 
to become unemployed if the real wage decreases in the informal sector. Bellow the 
border (wage), we rank the unemployed with the lowest reservation wage, and they   
will be the first to supply their labour on that market when the real informal wage 
increases. 
 
Once this ranking exercise is completed, we have ranking of workers to be selected by 
firms, to be hired or laid off (formal sector), and who respect the conditions of the 
model described above; and we have a labour supply model for the informal sector, 
based on the reservation wages of workers and unemployed.  Changes in the 
aggregate labour demand, in the formal sector in the CGE model, will determine the 
variation of frontier between the participants of that market segment and the non-
participants (but seeking a job in the given market), since the nominal wage is fixed. 
In the informal sector, we have an endogenous labour demand that will be directly 
influenced by the endogenous wage. We will, therefore, have a regime switching 
system were a worker can find himself on one market at base year, and on the other, 
or unemployed, after simulation.  
 
The changes in regime will materialize themselves when obtaining the specific wage 
of his sector of activity, or no wage, in the case of unemployment. This will clearly 
generate very important income changes in the affected households (either positively 
or negatively). This situation is not possible in a standard CGE model and this type of 
effect can generate very changes in poverty and income distribution, as a household 
loosing 100% or 80% of its income (in case of a job loss) will not have the same 
impact on indices, as we generally have in a traditional CGE were changes in income 
are rarely more then + or – 10%. Therefore, the HHMS model will have, as input, a 
price vector (including factor payments), and, as an output, the informal sector labour 
supply (or its mirror effect the unemployment rate). 
   17
The CGE model 
 
The CGE model used draws from chapter 9 of Decaluwé et al. (2001), which is 
characterized by the small open economy price taking hypothesis with import demand 
modeled with the Armington (1969) hypothesis. The main changes introduced in the 
model are the household consumption system, which is represented by a LES 
function, and the presence of a rationed dual segmented labour market with 
unemployment. We won’t present the details of the model as it uses standard features 
of a CGE model, and the reader can refer to Decaluwé et al. (2001) for more 
information. We will emphasize the presentation on the labour market, as this is what 
distinguishes it from other models
16. For the CGE modeling, as is shown in figure 1, 
we have two version of the model. The first model has both consumption and informal 
sector labour supply as endogenous; and in the second version, these two variables 
become exogenous. The reason behind this is that we use the first run of the CGE to 
provide a first order approximation of what the HHMS model results; which will 
facilitate convergence between the two models. Therefore, in the first run we try to 
reproduce the behaviour we modeled in the HHMS model.  
 
For some components, we reflect the specific behaviours of the HHMS model in the 
CGE model, and in other cases, it is necessary to introduce functions that will mimic 
characteristics of the HHMS model. We will only describe the labour market 
structure, as other aspects are straightforward. 
 
The first element we modify, in the model, is the segmentation of the labour market 
into two segments: the formal (who are mainly qualified) and informal (who are 
mainly unqualified). We suppose that the production branches will use a combination 
of both types of workers, and the optimal labour demand for each types of labour will 
be determined by a cost minimizing behaviour under the constraint of a CES function.  
 
We also introduce unemployment in the model, with the qualified labour market 
having a rigid nominal wage and therefore generating rationed unemployment, and 
some waiting unemployment based on the HHMS model where the reservation wage 
                                                 
16 Note that a similar type of dual segmented labour market with unemployment was modeled in Fortin, 
Marceau and Savard (1997) and Savard and Adjovi (1998)   18
of workers will determine the choice to work or to be unemployed. The nominal wage 
in the informal sector is flexible and will adjust to balance the supply and demand of 
labour. In the first run of the CGE model, we will try to mimic the behaviour 
explained in the HHMS section for the informal sector supply; to approximate this 
behaviour, we use the following equation that determines the new level of 








wo Uto Ut =  
where the Ut is the unemployed after simulation, Uto the unemployed at base year, 
wo2 the informal sector wage at base year, w2 the informal sector wage after 
simulation, and ξ  the elasticity of supply. We can see that, if the wage decreases after 
simulation, more potential workers will have the reservation wage above the 
prevailing wage, and therefore, we will observe a reduction in labour supply or an 
increase in unemployment. The elasticity used in the CGE model is drawn for from 
the estimation of the labour supply model around the queue constructed in the HHMS 
model. 
 
In the formal sector as we explained there is a fixed nominal wage and the change in 
labour demand will be generated by the change is the real wage (w
1/Pi); where Pi is 
the producer price of good i, is what is important for the producers decision-making 
process. The new prevailing real wage in each sector will then determine the 
aggregate labour demand. This will generate either an increase or a decrease in total 
labour demand. We need to add an equation that will replicate what happens in the 
household model in terms of origin (when we have hiring) or destination (when we 
have layoffs) of the workers. Do they come from the informal sector or do they come 
from unemployment. In fact, the ranking of workers and reservation wage comparison 
of the HHMS model has this information. Given this situation, we used the following 
equation to reflect this behaviour in the model. 
 
We present the sequential logic used to model this behaviour (even if the model is 
solved simultaneously). First, following the policy simulation we will observe a 
change in aggregate labour demand given the change in real wage. This change in   19
qualified labour demand is computed with the difference in the post simulation labour 
demand compared to the base year figure:  




i Ldqo Ldq Lsqc  
where Lsqc is the change in labour demand in the formal sector, Ldqo and Ldq are 
respectively the sectorial labour demand at base year and after simulation. Lsqc is 
then decomposed into the proportion of workers coming from unemployment: 
Lsqc Uq . δ =  
where Uq is the new qualified sector workers drawn from unemployment, and δ is the 
share of new qualified workers coming from unemployment
17. The remainder of new 
workers for the qualified sector are drawn from the unqualified sector 
 
( )Lsqc Lnqt δ − = 1  
 
where Lnqt is the new qualified sector workers coming from the informal sector. The 
δ  parameter is drawn from the HHMS model ranking at base year, and is recalculated 
at every iteration to take into account the actual position of the border between formal 
sector workers and non-formal sector workers, given the origin of the workers 
concerned. 
 
The total labour supply of the informal sector is determine by the following relation: 
 
Lnqt Ut Uto Lsnqo Lsnq − − + = ) (  
 
where Lsnq is the total labour supply for the unqualified sector, Lsnqo is the total 
labour supply of the informal sector at base year, and the other variables were defined 
earlier. Finally, the unemployment rate is a straightforward ratio of unemployed over 











It is important to highlight the macro-closure of the model to understand the results 
presented below. First, we fix the current account balance (CAB) and let the nominal 
                                                 
17 It is important to note that for calibration of this share, we perform numerical simulation to compute 
the share generated by the HH model labour supply. The share parameter of the CGE model is then 
drawn from this labour supply model.   20
exchange rate clear out this constraint. The total investment is fixed and government 
savings serve to clear this equation. We also use the models result (goods price 
vector) to compute an endogenous poverty line. In order to construct the poverty line, 
we identify the basic needs of households and associate specific volume for the goods 
basket. The price vector multiplies this goods vector pre and post simulation to 
compute the endogenous poverty line
18.  
 
Sequencing the CGE and HH Micro-Simulation models (linking). 
 
The main difficulty in this type of exercise is related to aggregation and coherence 
between the two models. As we stated in the introduction, the value added of this 
approach comes from the fact that feedback effects, provided by the household model, 
do not correspond to the aggregate behaviours of the representative households used 
in the CGE model; given non perfect aggregation characteristics described previously. 
It is interesting to take these feedback effects of the HH model back in the CGE to 
insure coherence between the two models.  
 
In the household model, our main objective is to calculate two variables (or vectors) 
that will back into the CGE model, in which they will be exogenous variables. The 
first one is the aggregate goods consumption vector; the second is the informal sector 
labour supply (this will be calculated via two sources; laid off workers of the formal 
sector and labour supply of the informal sector) produced by the household model, 
and to introduce the feedback effect into the CGE model on an aggregate level. The 
procedure is relatively simple for the household consumption, as the HHMS model 
generates a consumption matrix of 20 goods by 39520 households, and we simply 
aggregate the individual consumption over all 39520 households, which produces a 
single vector for consumption as an output of the HH model. The aggregate 
consumption vector obtained from the HH model is then imported into the CGE 
model. When doing this, we absolutely need to change the hypothesis of the model to 
allow it to be fully determined. Since we now have the consumption vector as 
exogenous, we will remove the equations determining consumption in the first run of 
the CGE model.  Given this change, we need to insure the balance of the household 
                                                 
18 For more information of this approach to compute an endogenous poverty line see Decaluwé et al. 
(1999a).   21
budget constraint.  A variable of this budget constraint needs to be endogenized in the 
following equation: 
 
Tgh Sh Ydh Thc − − =  
 
where Thc is the total household consumption. The price vector of goods and the 
consumption levels obtained from the HH model directly determines this consumption 
variable. The household disposable income (Ydh), and household savings (Sh), are a 
fixed proportion of the household’s income in the first run of the CGE. The transfers 
between the government and the household (Tgh) are exogenous. Two options are 
available to balance out the aggregate household budget constraint. First, Tgh could 
be endogenized or the savings rates could become endogenous.  Sg is determined by 
Yh Sh ϕ = and, as this relation needs to be respected. Endogenizing the marginal 
propensity to save (savings rate) ϕ  will allow respecting the savings relation and 
balance out the equation for Thc.  
 
On the labour market side, we simply calculate the new value for Ut, and calculate the 
value to attribute to the δ  parameter. The two variables help us calculate a new 
labour supply in the informal sector. The equation determining Ut in the first runs of 
the CGE model is removed in the subsequent runs of the model, and is entirely 
determined by the HHMS model.  
 
The rest of the CGE model’s hypotheses are left unchanged
19. As will be seen in the 




Running the full model involves the following procedure. We first compute the 
standard CGE simulation and sequentially run the household model. The solution of 
the HH model (consumption vector and labour supply variables (Ut and δ ) are 
transformed into a data file that is used in the looping version of the combined model. 
                                                 
19 We experimented on both, and the results were not strongly affected by the choice of either of the 
two variables. But as the Tgh at base year was null it is difficult to interpret the variation from a 0 
point. For the savings rate, it is easier to evaluate if the variation is marginal or not. 
20 In all the experiments performed, the variation was always less then 10% This is in the case of an 
initial savings rate of 11,34% with an 8.07% increase in the savings rate which brings the savings rate 
to 12,26% This is less then a 1% point in increase.    22
In the second run (or looping version of the CGE model), as we stated, we need to 
change the hypothesis of the CGE model as the household consumption vector, and 
Ut are now determined by the HH model. We remove the two equations and transform 
the consumption vector and Ut into an exogenous vector and variable. In the looping 
version, we run up to 12 loops automatically between the two models. In both 
scenarios presented, convergence at 6th decimal is obtained around the 8
th loop. We 
should note that convergence is verified on the household consumption vector
21 as 
well as on Ut variable.  
 
An application of the “top-down/bottom-up” CGE-HHMS model. 
 
An application of this approach was done on the Philippines data. The models were 
constructed using the 1997 Family Income and Expenditure Survey (FIES), the 
Labour Force Survey for 1997 to 1998, and the 1990 Social Accounting Matrix 
(SAM). The FIES and LFS were used extensively in the HH model and to estimate 
the labour supply, and the FIES and SAM were used in the CGE model. The main 
data manipulation needed was the conversion of the FIES nomenclature into the 
national accounts nomenclature found in the SAM. This was relatively easy and 
straightforward, as the level of aggregation was quite high. The other data operation 
consisted in modifying household income and expenditure vectors of the SAM to 
have a perfect correspondence with the aggregate structures computed from the FIES 
data. In this process, we created disequilibria in the SAM that required standard SAM 
balancing procedure
22. As was stated earlier, it was not necessary to have a perfect 
balance between the income and expenditure accounts for each household, as we 
transmit the effect via a percentage variation from the income to the expenditure. This 
spares for the need to introduce balancing hypothesis, which often lead to denaturing 
the household’s income or expenditure structures. Since we import the aggregate 
structure of income and expenditure from the FIES or the HHMS model into the SAM 
and the CGE model, and not nominal level, this constraint (of balancing household 
                                                 
21 We tested a number of other policy simulation and the speed of convergence seems to be quite 
similar from one to the other. We maintained a higher number of loops to get convergence at 7 
decimals for all goods.  
22 We did not use an automated procedure to balance out the SAM as these methods can sometimes 
modify structures without considering economic behaviour. We maintained all household accounts 
fixed, and balanced the SAM in the relatively large accounts in order to minimize the change in 
structure and not the changes in errors (as do automated procedures).   23
income and expenditure) no longer needs to be respected, as it is the case in the CGM-




We performed two types of policy simulation to illustrate the mechanics of the 
approach, as well as the types of results that can be produced. First, we simulate a 
30% reduction in import tariffs across the board, and second, we increase the qualified 
sector wage by 20%. We display succinct macro-economic results by concentrating 
on factor payments, as these are the key variables in terms of poverty and income 
distribution analysis. In Table 1, we present macro results and in Table 2 we show a 
few results by production branches. Finally, we present poverty analysis results as 
well as income distribution measures.  
 
Simulation 1: Reduction across the board of import tariffs by 30%. 
 
Let us first observe a few macro effects, and then, some sector-based effects, which 
help in the understanding of the macro changes. The first order effect of this policy is 
to reduce the price of imports, and therefore, increase the domestic demand for them.  
Given the fixed current account balance (CAB), we observe a pressure upwards on the 
nominal exchange rate (0,35%) to reduce imports and increase exports to balance out 
the  CAB.  The government income (Yg) is strongly reduced (-8,42%) given the 
importance of import tariffs as a source of income for government, moreover, as we 
fixed the total investment, government savings must balance out the saving 
investment constraint, and therefore, the policy generates an important reduction in 
public expenditure. This policy puts pressure on the labour market as civil servants 
are laid off due to the reduction in government spending. This effect is transmitted 
through unemployment (Ui), which rises by 3,34% and produces a negative effect on 
the informal wage, which drops by –1,12%.  In this first scenario, we observe a strong 
decrease in the poverty threshold (-1,31) resulting in market price decrease of goods 
composing the basic needs basket of the poverty threshold.  This price decrease was 
the result of the decrease in prices of imports provoking a reduction in market price of 
aggregate goods (which include imported goods). This drop in import price is a direct 
result  of the reduction in import duties.    24
 
In terms of capital payment, we note that owners of the mining, logging-timber and 
livestock capital are the beneficiaries from the policies whereas owners of the finance, 
electricity-gas-water and other agriculture capital are the main losers of this policy. 
The value added of production branches increases the most in the mining  and 
construction, and the only two branches to see a reduction in their outputs are 
electricity-gas and water and finance sectors. 
Table 1: Macro results of CGE model after convergence 
 
Variables  Base 




Simulation 2  
10% increase 
in w-q  
Yh  86,48 -0,61  -0,63 
Yg  20,37 -8,49  -0,66 
Ye  26,17 0,43  -0,84 
Sg  -1,16 -8,42  -1,92 
Sm  9,65 -1,90  0,88 
Ui  0,17 3,34  5,80 
w
1  1,00 0,00 10,00 
w
2  0,50 -1,12 -4,55 
e  1,00 0,35  0,07 
mps  11,34 -3,39  2,42 
GDP  104,51 -0.74  -1,00 
Poverty threshold  1185,00 -1,31  -1,86 
      
 
Simulation 2: An increase of 10% in the qualified sector fixed wage. 
 
In this scenario we observed, as expected, an important drop of the unqualified sector 
wage as the qualified labour demand decreases strongly with the policy increase of the 
nominal wage. Many workers will chose to supply their labour in the unqualified 
sector market, producing a drop of 4,55% in the nominal unqualified wage (w
2). It is 
important to note that there is also a demand effect on labour as producers will shift 
their demand from qualified to unqualified, as (w
1/ w
2) increased. As for laid off 
formal sector workers, given their reservation wage some will prefer to become 
unemployed on the basis of their reservation wage with respect to the prevailing wage 
(w
2). This will, in part, contribute to an increase of 5,80% in the unemployment rate 
(Ui). The other portion of the increase in unemployment comes from informal sector   25
workers (at base year) no longer willing to work at the reduced nominal wage (w
2) 
level. The effect on the government side is a lot less drastic, with a reduction of 
income of 0,66% and a reduction of 1,92% of government saving. In this policy 
simulation, there is also a pressure for a decrease in prices, which generates a 
reduction in the poverty threshold of 1.86%. 
Table 2: Sectorial results of the CGE-HH model after convergence 
Variables  branches  Base  Simulation 1  - 50% 
on import tariffs 
Simulation 2  20% 
increase in w-q 
        
Va  Paley & corn  14800  0,23  -0,18 
Va  Fruit & vegetable  13000  0,34  0,18 
Va  Coconut 14100  0,48  -0,29 
Va  Livestock 18700  0,55  -0,02 
Va  Fishing 14600  0,40  0,15 
Va  Other agric.  14800  0,20  0,89 
Va  Logging and timber  3800  0,71  -0,07 
Va  Mining 12000  1,57  -0,56 
Va  Manufacturing 96500  0,70  -1,31 
Va  Rice manufacturing  10400  0,36  -0,28 
Va  Meat industry  12200  0,65  -0,32 
Va  Food manufacturing  20700  0,19  0,40 
Va  Elec. Gas Water  8200  -0,54  -1,22 
Va  Construction 79400  1,39  0,46 
Va  Commerce 103500  0,59  -0,81 
Va  Trans. & comm.  44900  0,41  -0,42 
Va  Finance 17400  -0,79  -1,67 
Va  Real estate  30400  0,33  -1,83 
Va  Services 65300  0,43  -0,45 
r  Paley & corn  1,00  0,53  -5,31 
r  Fruit & vegetable  1,00  1,14  -2,72 
r  Coconut 1,00  0,09  -4,86 
r  Livestock 1,00  1,51  -3,20 
r  Fishing 1,00  1,10  -3,32 
r  Other agric.  1,00  -0,61  -2,05 
r  Logging and timber  1,00  2,06  -4,56 
r  Mining 1,00  2,79  -1,56 
r  Manufacturing 1,00  0,86  0,06 
r  Rice manufacturing  1,00  0,36  -3,39 
r  Meat industry  1,00  1,10  -3,44 
r  Food manufacturing  1,00  -0,33  -1,19 
r  Elec. Gas Water  1,00  -2,19  1,69 
r  Construction 1,00  1,24  -2,18 
r  Commerce 1,00  0,75  0,97 
r  Trans. & comm.  1,00  -0,11  -3,84 
r  Finance 1,00  -2,49  0,44 
r  Real estate  1,00  0,82  4,99 
r  Services 1,00  0,03  -0,37 
   26
The capital payments are also pushed downwards with the biggest decrease in the 
paley & corn, coconut and logging-timber sectors. We observe an increase in four 
branches, namely real-estate,  electricity, gas and water,  commerce,  finance  and 
manufacturing. The output, or value added, increases the most in other agriculture, 
construction and food manufacturing branches, and the decrease is the strongest in 
real-estate, finance and manufacturing sectors. 
 
Poverty and income distribution analysis   
 
The main objective of this section is to illustrate the type of poverty and income 
distribution analysis that can be performed with the output of the convergent solution 
of the HHMS model.  The indicators presented are far from being exhaustive as it is 
possible to apply all types of measures and methodologies given the fact that the 
model produces a post simulation income vector for all households (39520) found in 
the survey. We only apply the Foster, Greer and Thorbecke (1984) (FGTα) 
decomposable indices as well as the GINI index. We present results for two types of 
decomposition household groupings. This is done to demonstrate that the approach 
avoids the difficult choice of household classification raised by Di Maio et al. (1999) 
in the CGE-RH approach. This is possible as there is no classification in either the 
CGE or HHMS models.  The analyst, after computation of models results, is free to 
choose the decomposition for poverty and income distribution analysis. The only 
constraint to household decomposition is bound by information found in the 




We note that the first policy simulation has a significant positive impact on poverty 
reduction at the national level (-1,77%). This decrease is strongly linked to the change 
in the poverty threshold that decreases by 1,31%. By combining income effect and 
threshold effect
23, we get a decrease in poverty for all educational groups except for 
the most educated group, who see their poverty increase by 4,83%. If we isolate and 
                                                 
23 Income effect is the change in the head count ration computed by maintaining the poverty threshold 
fixed. We simply use the changes in income of each household. The threshold effect is the contribution 
of the change in the endogenous poverty threshold calculated by the model and reflects the changes in 
the cost of basic needs basket as the income effects represent the change in income of households.    27
look exclusively at the income effect, we get an increase in FGT0 in all groups, except 
for the non reported group (#0)
24. We have a similar situation when looking at poverty 
by regional decomposition, as the threshold effect pushes all indices to decrease, with 
the exception of Manila region households (group 13) with an increase of 0,26%.  
However, when we isolate income effect, we have an increase in all regions, although 
the increase is very small in region 9 and 15 with 0,10% and 0,11% respectively.  
 
Table 3: FGT poverty indices of P0 Decomposition by two household groups 
With endogenous poverty line 
   Code  Base  Sim1  Variation  sim2  Variation 
            %     % 
                  
Country     31,093 30,543  -1,77 32,144 3,38 
                  
0 53,515  52,234  -2,39 53,501 -0,03 
1 48,879  48,103  -1,59 49,400 1,07 
2 39,243  38,543  -1,78 39,672 1,09 
3 33,953  33,325  -1,85 34,626 1,98 
4 21,433  20,940  -2,30 22,197 3,56 





6 2,718  2,850  4,83 3,032  11,53 
                    
1 34,093  33,232  -2,53 34,829 2,16 
2 30,198  29,726  -1,56 30,371 0,57 
3 14,938  14,622  -2,11 15,462 3,51 
4 24,456  23,896  -2,29 24,872 1,70 
5 46,432  45,797  -1,37 47,297 1,86 
6 35,047  34,411  -1,81 35,952 2,58 
7 30,060  29,493  -1,89 30,417 1,19 
8 38,271  37,653  -1,61 38,787 1,35 
9 32,616  32,054  -1,73 32,837 0,68 
10 41,784  40,859  -2,21 42,244 1,10 
11 34,272  33,756  -1,51 34,547 0,80 
12 45,390  45,076  -0,69 45,953 1,24 
13 6,223  6,239 0,26 7,385  18,68 
14 38,011  37,201  -2,13 37,969 -0,11 
15 58,198  56,350  -3,18 57,125 -1,84 
Regions 
16 49,020  48,692  -0,67 49,175 0,32 
 
Simulation 2 produces different results, and one that merits to be highlighted, as it 
would not be possible to obtain such a result in CGE-RH and CGE-IMH approaches. 
In these models, an increase in the formal sector wage would inevitably benefit the 
                                                 
24 Results of income effect are found in Annexe 2. Description of coding for education level of head of 
household and regional classification is provided in annexe 4.   28
most educated and hurt the less educated. However, with our labour market 
assumptions (of endogenous labour supply, unemployment) we obtain somewhat 
counter-intuitive results. We have that poverty levels increase the most for educated, 
and less for the lower educated groups. These results from the fact that the increase in 
the formal sector wage benefit mainly the non poor, and therefore does not have much 
effect on poverty indices. However the important effect of this policy is the strong lay 
off of workers in the formal sector given higher wages. The other effect is the strong 
reduction of the informal sector wage (-4,55%). We need to look at who are the ones 
concerned by this. Laid off workers of the formal sector will go in the informal sector 
and get lower paying wages; this produces a drop of over 50% in their income, as 
most of the workers in the formal sector are educated, they will be strongly affected. 
Moreover, of this group, the ones that are most educated will have a higher 
reservation wage (on average and ceteris paribus), and therefore, many will choose to 
be unemployed. The workers will get an even stronger negative impact on their 
income. The third mechanism in the model that explain these results are the informal 
sector workers who see their wage drop by 4,55%, and therefore, the ones with the 
highest reservation wage in that group, who are also the most educated, decide to 
become unemployed. Therefore, these three combined effects will play a stronger 
effect than the marginal changes on the formal sector and informal wages.   
 
In the case of regional decomposition, we observe a reduction of the headcount ratio 
only in region 14 and 15, and a strong increase in poverty in the capital region (13). 
We also note that the regions 1, 3 and 6, all see the poverty levels increase by more 
then 2%. When we isolate the threshold effect, we get a negative impact on all regions 
except in Autonomous Region of Muslim Mindanao (-0,06%). 
 
In annexe, we present results for FGT1 and FGT2, but we won’t describe the results in 
this paper. We will simply highlight the fact that these indicators generally follow the 
trend of the headcount ratio, but the magnitude of the effects is often modified 
according to the decomposition and simulations performed. We note that we get 
different signs, in a few instances such as for the college undergraduate who have a 
reduction in headcount for simulation 1, but an increase in depth and severity of 
poverty. 





We applied GINI index for the whole population, calculated inter-group and intra-
group indices and this for decomposition at the educational and regional levels.  We 
can see that the first simulation increases inequality for all groupings but the Bicol 
Region and Cordillera Administrative Region, who experience a drop in inequality. 
The intra-group inequality increases more than the inter-group for both educational 
and regional decomposition.  
 
For the second simulation, the inequality effects are much stronger with a 1,48% 
increase at the national level. It is interesting to note that in this case, we have the 
inter-group effect stronger for educational decomposition, and intra-group effect 
stronger in the case of the regional decomposition. Given our explanation of the 
poverty effect on the educated group in the previous section, it is not surprising to see 
this group has a strong increase in the index. The explanation can be found in the fact 
that the richest of the group keep their jobs and get a higher wage, and some of the 
poorest of the group loose their formal sector job, and get a informal sector wage or 
become unemployed. When considering regional decomposition, we note that the 
effects are quit similar for all regions with Cordillera Administrative Region, and the 
Autonomous Region of Muslim Mindanao having the lowest inequality effects in the 
Bicol Region, the Western Visayas and the Region National Capital Region having 
the strongest inequality effects.    30
Table 3: Income distribution measure: GINI decomposition by 
Educational and Regional groupings 
   Code  Base  Sim1  Variation  sim2  Variation 
            %     % 
                    
Country  0,5182 0,5188  0,12 0,5265 1,48 
GiniDecomposition by Educational Groups 
Inter-Group  0,4537 0,4541  0,09 0,4617 1,67 
Intra-Group  0,0646 0,0647  0,15 0,0648 0,15 
0  0,3987 0,3991  0,10 0,3992 0,03 
1  0,4073 0,4073  0,00 0,4092 0,47 
2  0,4111 0,4112  0,02 0,4134 0,54 
3  0,4158 0,4167  0,22 0,4191 0,58 
4  0,4133 0,4152  0,46 0,4185 0,79 
5  0,4551 0,4554  0,07 0,4582 0,61 
Level of 
education 
of head of 
household
6  0,4920 0,4935  0,30 0,4999 1,30 
Gini Decomposition by Regional Groups 
Inter-Group  0,4712 0,4717  0,11 0,4785 1,44 
Intra-Group  0,0470 0,0471  0,21 0,0480 1,91 
1  0,4590 0,4595  0,11 0,4648 1,15 
2  0,4271 0,4275  0,09 0,4333 1,36 
3  0,3854 0,3868  0,36 0,3925 1,47 
4  0,4462 0,4467  0,11 0,4537 1,57 
5  0,4684 0,4681  -0,06 0,4767 1,84 
6  0,4533 0,4543  0,22 0,4624 1,78 
7  0,5035 0,5040  0,10 0,5110 1,39 
8  0,4649 0,4650  0,02 0,4724 1,59 
9  0,4829 0,4831  0,04 0,4892 1,26 
10  0,5236 0,5241  0,10 0,5324 1,58 
11  0,4696 0,4703  0,15 0,4757 1,15 
12  0,4621 0,4625  0,09 0,4698 1,58 
13  0,5085 0,5093  0,16 0,5192 1,94 
14  0,5042 0,5038  -0,08 0,5088 0,99 
15  0,3766 0,3767  0,03 0,3802 0,93 
Regions 





In this paper, we demonstrate why it is important to take into account the feedback 
effects of household behaviours generated by a HHHS model back into a CGE model, 
as we have a number of elements preventing perfect aggregation of micro-economic 
behaviours, and, therefore, representative household in the CGE cannot reflect 
behaviours of the HHMS model. We also discussed some of the advantages tied to 
working in a separate context for household micro-simulation modelling instead of   31
using the CGE-IMH approach. We illustrated the mechanics of the top-down/bottom-
up approach of CGE and HHMS modelling by constructing a relatively standard 
CGE, and by incorporating some of the labour market behaviours modelled in the 
HHMS model. We also constructed a HHMS model with income and expenditure 
structures of the household survey, and integrated labour market supply behaviour 
inspired by the modelling proposed by Magnac (1991). We then proceeded to explain 
the links between these two models to insure global coherence and to obtain a 
converging solution, which was consequently obtained after 10 loops between the two 
models.  
 
We think that this approach provides richer information than the standard CGE-RH 
approach, more flexibility (larger number of households and use of more flexible 
functional forms) than the CGE-IMH approach, and more global coherence than the 
unidirectional CGE-MS approach. We also demonstrate that more richness in the 
household behaviour can generate results that are difficult if not impossible to obtain 
from the CGE-RH and CGE-IMH approaches.  
 
One of the drawbacks is that the approach is not as tractable as the first two 
approaches. We also show that the approach is extremely flexible in terms of 
application of poverty and income distribution measures, and in terms of the types and 
level of decomposition that can be made ex-post to the modelling exercise, which is 
not the case with the most commonly used CGE-RH approach, and that was rightly 
criticized by Di Maio et al (1999).  
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Annexe 1 : Calculation of FGT1 and FGT2 
      FGT P1 Index (depth of poverty)  FGT P2 Index (severity of poverty) 
      Base  Sim1  Variation  sim2 Variation  Base Sim1 Variation  sim2  Variation
            %     %        %     % 
Country     12,97 12,68  -2,22  13,29 2,51  6,09 5,93  -2,63  6,30  6,24 
                                   
0 23,48  22,82  -2,81  23,58 0,43 11,50 11,10 -3,48 11,59 4,41 
1 21,74  21,16  -2,67  22,04 1,38 10,77 10,41 -3,34 10,98 5,48 
2 16,09  15,67  -2,63  16,43 2,14 7,47  7,23  -3,21 7,69 6,36 
3 12,83  12,58  -1,91  13,22 3,04 5,67  5,56  -1,94 5,91 6,29 
4 7,02  6,97  -0,67  7,44  6,01 2,99  2,99  0,00 3,25 8,70 





6 0,77  0,81  5,90  0,96 25,46 0,29  0,33 13,79 0,44 33,33 
                                   
1 12,04  11,72  -2,66  12,45 3,41 5,21  5,03  -3,45 5,46 8,55 
2 13,75  13,35  -2,91  14,06 2,25 5,84  5,62  -3,77 6,02 7,12 
3 4,14  4,09  -1,21  4,49  8,45 1,54  1,55  0,65 1,75  12,90 
4 7,14  6,92  -3,08  7,39  3,50  2,95 2,86  -3,05  3,12  9,09 
5 21,58  21,14  -2,04  22,19 2,83 10,20 9,94 -2,55 10,61 6,74 
6 15,87  15,59  -1,76  16,54 4,22 7,12  6,98  -1,97 7,56 8,31 
7 20,39  19,94  -2,21  20,80 2,01 10,37 10,09 -2,70 10,66 5,65 
8 23,72  23,17  -2,32  23,99 1,14 11,95 11,60 -2,93 12,12 4,48 
9 20,05  19,59  -2,29  20,44 1,95 10,23 9,94 -2,83 10,49 5,53 
10 19,44  19,06  -1,95  19,86 2,16 9,59  9,38  -2,19 9,94 5,97 
11 16,14  15,81  -2,04  16,42 1,73 7,64  7,44  -2,62 7,80 4,84 
12 21,69  21,27  -1,94  22,03 1,57 11,16 10,87 -2,60 11,37 4,60 
13 0,51 0,53  3,92  0,66 29,41 0,15  0,18 20,00 0,23 27,78 
14 14,13  13,82  -2,19  14,09 -0,28 6,68  6,55  -1,95 6,71 2,44 
15 19,70  18,96  -3,76  19,21 -2,49 7,93  7,53  -5,04 7,68 1,99 
Regions 
16 23,87  23,32  -2,30  24,15 1,17 12,25 11,87 -3,10 12,44 4,80 
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Annexe 2: FGT0 headcount index with poverty threshold exogenous. 
   Code  Base  Sim1  Variation  sim2  Variation 
            %     % 
                  
Country     31,093 31,332  0,767 32,011 2,953 
                  
0 53,515  53,467  -0,091 53,786 0,505 
1 48,879  49,081  0,414 49,957 2,207 
2 39,243  39,440  0,502 40,256 2,582 
3 33,953  34,222  0,793 35,180 3,614 
4 21,433  21,833  1,867 22,549 5,204 




household 6 2,718  2,926  7,636 3,100  14,059 
                    
1 34,093  34,292  0,583 35,616 4,466 
2 30,198  30,378  0,596 30,848 2,152 
3 14,938  15,243  2,047 15,856 6,145 
4 24,456  24,646  0,774 25,462 4,110 
5 46,432  46,795  0,783 47,778 2,898 
6 35,047  35,502  1,298 36,306 3,594 
7 30,060  30,210  0,499 30,644 1,943 
8 38,271  38,500  0,598 39,149 2,293 
9 32,616  32,648  0,098 33,372 2,317 
10 41,784  42,048  0,633 42,662 2,103 
11 34,272  34,419  0,430 34,918 1,887 
12 45,390  45,703  0,689 46,265 1,928 
13 6,223  6,644  6,766 7,647  22,884 
14 38,011  38,242  0,609 38,627 1,621 
15 58,198  58,262  0,110 58,163  -0,061 
Regions 
16 49,020  49,160  0,287 49,849 1,691   37
Annexe 3: Labour supply model estimation results 
Probit 
Regressor    Coefficient   Std. Error  t-stat  Prob>|t| 
constant  1.61683   0.46963  3.44281   0.00029 
education  0.14937    0.00932   16.02265  0.00000 
age   -0.10990    0.02984   -3.68280  0.00012 
age2   0.00121    0.00030     3.99504   0.00003 
experience  0.02414   0.00976  2.47298   0.00671 
size of family  0.06281    0.00779  8.06703  0.00000 
        
Heckman 2-Step Estimates of Selection Model 
Qualified 
Regressor   coefficient  Std. Error  t-stat  prob>|t| 
constant  4.15523    0.55819  7.44413  0.00000 
education  0.22921  0.03320   6.90336  0.00000  
age  0.06746     0.02143  3.14754    0.00084  
age2  -0.00064  0.00025    -2.59636    0.00476  
size of family  -0.26829  0.08243     -3.25484   0.00058  
Lambda   -0.90843  0.25598  -3.54883  0.00020  
        
Heckman 2-Step Estimates of Selection Model 
Unqualified 
Regressor   coefficient  Std. Error  t-stat  prob>|t| 
constant  3.25639   0.48463   6.71934   0.00000  
education  0.12500   0.03129    3.99533    0.00003  
age  0.05280  0.01901    2.77727   0.00275 
age2   -0.00055   -0.00055   -2.52059   0.00588  
lambda   -1.65604  0.25121   -6.59213  0.00000   38
 
Annex 4: Regional code definition 
Region Code  Region 
Identification  Region Name 
1  Region I  Ilocos Region 
2  Region II  Cagayan Valley 
3  Region III  Central Luzon Region 
4  Region IV  Souther Luzon Region 
5  Region V  Bicol Region 
6  Region VI  Western Visayas Region 
7  Region VII  Central Visayas Region 
8  Region VIII  Eastern Visayas Region 
9  Region IX  Western Mindanao Region 
10  Region X  Northern Mindanao Region 
11  Region XI  Southern Mindanao Region 
12  Region XII  Central Mindanao Region 
13  NCR  National Capital Region 
14  CAR  Cordillera Administrative Region 
15  ARMM  Autonomous Region of Muslim Mindanao 
16  Caranga Region  Caranga Region   39
Annexe 5: Educational code definition 
Education Code  Level of education 
1  Elementary undergraduate 
2  Elementary graduate 
3  1
st to 3rd Year High school 
4  High School Graduate 
5  College Undergraduate 
6  At least College graduate 
0  Not reported or no grade 
   40
 
Annexe 6: table of comparative advantages of the four approaches discussed 












CGE-RH ***  *  *  ***  *  *** 
CGE-IMH **  **  *  ***  **  ** 
CGE-MS *  ***  ***  *  ***  *** 
CGE-HHS **  ***  **  **  ***  *** 
*** High 
** Medium 
* Low 